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VERTICAL COORDINATION: 
A TRANSACTIONS COST APPROACH 
ABSTRACT 
Vertical coordination has been shown to be superior to vertical integration as an 
element of industrial structure. In this paper, the effects of transaction costs on 
vertical coordination are investigated. The results confirm the theoretical expectation 
that transaction costs are the primary motivation for vertical coordination. 
VERTICAL COORDINATION: A TRANSACTIONS COST APPROACH 
Increased interest has arisen in vertical coordination as a more 
comprehensive industry structural variable than vertical integration. When 
considering the organization, synchronization, and efficiency of economic sub-
sectors, vertical integration is only but one aspect. Vertical coordination 
includes not only vertical integration but all other forms of vertical 
harmonization. As such, it not only captures the process(es) of vertical 
synchronization, but also the interdependence between the vertical components 
in a sub-sector. The number and magnitude of vertical linkages provide 
insight into the importance of vertical coordination. Moreover, the level of 
transactional inefficiencies affect not only the mechanisms of coordination 
between interdependent stages, but ultimately, the sub-sector's ability to 
meet consumer demands. 
Commonly cited studies exam~n~ng vertical coordination in the food 
manufacturing industries by Mighell and Jones and Marion (1976) qualitatively 
discussed the antecedents and implications of vertical coordination. These 
casually linked transaction costs to vertical coordination. Recently, Frank 
has generated a quantitative measure of vertical coordination for the food 
manufacturing industries. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine 
transaction costs and related factors as determinants of vertical coordination 
in the food industries. 
Vertical Coordination and Transaction Costs 
Mighell and Jones (pg. 1) define vertical coordination as "the general 
term that includes all the ways of harmonizing the vertical stages of 
production and marketing. The market price system, vertical integration, 
contracting, and cooperation singly or in combination are some of the 
alternative means of coordination." This may be interpreted as the many ways 
in which vertically interdependent stages are controlled and dire.cted through 
various governance structures. Marion (1976, pg. 180) further defines 
vertical coordination as the "process by which the various functions of a 
vertical value adding system are brought into harmony." 
There is an extensive literature examining vertical integration, but 
relatively little on the more comprehensive concept of vertical coordination. 
Both Coase and Williamson (1975, 1979) have theoretically examined factors 
affecting the organization of production in a market-hierarchy framework. In 
this framework, the criterion for organizing production is the minimization of 
production and transaction costs (Williamson, 1979). Transaction costs are 
associated with the exchange of goods or services. Williamson (1979, pg. 233) 
suggests that transaction costs are the primary force behind vertical 
integration, stating that "if transaction costs are negligible, the 
organization of economic activity is irrelevant." That is, the vertical 
coordination mechanisms utilized are motivated by economic considerations 
(i.e. transaction costs). 
Three factors that characterize transactions are; market uncertainties 
(i.e. demand and price), the complexity and frequency of transactions, and 
idiosyncratic investments (Williamson, 1975, 1979). These factors lead to 
bounded rationality and/or opportunism. The institutional mechanisms of 
vertical coordination are a response to the degree to which bounded 
rationality (the intellectual and physical limitations of human behavior) 
and/or opportunism occur. 
Past empirical studies have examined the effects of transactional 
inefficiencies on vertical integration (ownership), but not on the broader 
concept of vertical coordination. For instance, Levy and MacDonald examined 
the costs of using the market (transaction costs) to explain the incidence of 
vertical integration across manufacturing industries. That research found 
significant linkages between market costs and vertical integration. However, 
linkages between transaction costs and vertical coordination have not been 
empirically analyzed. Further, little empirical analysis has been reported on 
the effects of transaction costs on vertical linkages between farms and food 
manufacturing industries. 
Classification of Vertical Coordination 
The theory of vertical integration assumes ownership of assets in 
neighboring stages of production, allowing for complete control over the 
production process. However, control over adjoining stages of production need 
not be accomplished through direct ownership. One aspect of vertical 
coordination focusses on the role of contractual and implicit arrangements in 
vertical relationships. Contractual arrangements discussed by Williamson 
(1979) and Mighell and Jones range from virtually no control to those that 
transfer almost complete control from one firm to another. Tacit arrangements 
(e.g. providing technical expertise and advice, increased credit, etc.) allow 
firms some control over vertically interdependent enterprises that are owned 
by others (Blois). 
Williamson (1979), using Macneil's three way contract classification, 
put forth a theoretical scheme for classifying solutions to coordination. The 
three classes of contract law are; classical, neoclassical, and relational. 
Classical contracts are based on a set of legal rules with formal documents 
and self-liquidating transactions. Neoclassical contracts generally involve 
longer-term arrangements that do not cover all future contingencies. This 
contract scheme maintains a "trading" environment, but with additional 
governance structure (i.e. arbitration). Relational contracts focus not only 
on the original agreement, but the entire spectrum of the contracting parties' 
relationship, including tacit as well as explicit arrangements. 
In this scheme, increases in transaction complexity, frequency, and 
uncertainty, accompanied by idiosyncratic investments, result in a shift in 
the control or coordination structure from classical to neoclassical to 
bilateral and finally to unilateral relational contracts. Typically, under 
this progression, one party acquires increasing control. 
Williamson's discussion provides theoretical insight into the 
contractual structure of vertical coordination. Specific to the food and 
fiber system, Mighell and Jones identified three general types of contracts; 
market specification, production management, and resource providing. These 
can be viewed to parallel Williamson's theoretical treatment of vertical 
coordination in terms of transferring control (Figure 1). 
Market specification contracts are standardized contracts in which the 
supplier transfers part of the risk and management functions to the 
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contractor. Transferred management only regards the decision of what to 
produce and \lhen and where the product is to be delivered. Production 
management contracts are similar except the contractor has increased contrc11 
over the production process. When the contractor is concerned with the 
quality of production, the transfer of managerial decisions usually takes the 
form of resource specification. Finally, resource providing contracts are the 
closest to vertical integration. The contractor not only provides a market 
for the production, but also is a major provider of inputs into the production 
process. 
However, when comparing Williamson's theoretical contract scheme and 
Mighell and Jones' contract classification some limitations become obvious. 
Williamson has more completely examined the theoretical relationship between 
transaction costs and vertical governance structures. In addition, Williamson 
uses "relational contracts" as a rather all encompassing term. It captures 
the explicit contractual ties of interdependent industries as well as the 
implicit arrangements between firms. Thus, "relational contracts" capture a 
dynamic relationship between interdependent firms. Interdependent firms 
establish a set of implicit trading relationships or standard operating 
procedures. Relational contracts entail adjustment processes as trading 
relations develop through time. By contrast, Mighell and Jones have not 
explicitly linked transaction cost factors to vertical governance. Moreover, 
their classification captures a more discrete and explicit form of inter-
relationship between firms. As defined, these contracts do not reflect the 
tacit dynamics of many industrial relationships. Thus, these contracts do not 
capture the entire relationship as it evolves through time, understating the 
extent of common or shared control among vertically interdependent firms. 
These limiting factors suggest the Mighell and Jones' contract 
classification is not a perfect substitute for Williamson's contract scheme. 
Therefore, incorporating Mighell and Jones' contract classification into an 
empirical analysis of vertical coordination may introduce some bias. 
Empirical Measurement of Vertical Coordination 
A specification which includes both ownership and explicit and tacit 
contractual relationships of vertically interdependent firms or industries 
should more completely measure vertical coordination than the traditional 
measures of vertical integration. Such a specification should include both 
the direct and indirect transfer or sharing of control, as well as the degree 
of interdependency among firms and industries. 
Empirical research has examined vertical coordination primarily in the 
context of vertical integration. Studies by Adelman, Tucker and Wilder, 
Laffer, and Levy used variations of the value-added to sales ratio to 
calculate vertical integration. However, this ratio is influenced by such 
factors as firm profitability and the position of the firm in the production 
process. Moreover, it does not capture the partial transfer or sharing of 
control between vertically related firms or industries through contracts and 
agreements. 
A second measure of vertical integration examines the linkages between 
industries through production functions. Maddigan advanced this measure, 
which considers the input-output interdependencies between firms. These 
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interdependencies are captured by aggregate production functions and are 
expressed by physical input-output coefficients. 
Because a complete specification of vertical coordination incorporates 
industry interlinkages in addition to the direct (ownership) and indirect 
(contractual) structures of control, a starting point for measuring vertical 
coordination is Maddigan's Vertical Industry Connection (VIC) index. This 
index exploits the interactions of the Leontief input-output model. Briefly, 
the Leontief model is based upon the theory of the firm. It is assumed each 
firm maximizes profits subject to its production function and final demand for 
its output. With the necessary and sufficient conditions satisfied, an 
optimal solution vector of inputs for each firm is determined. The optimal 
level of output for each firm is then obtained by substituting the solution 
vector of inputs into the firm's production function. The whole system of 
firms attains equilibrium when the value of the outputs supplied by each 
industry equals the demand for inputs by each industry and final output by 
consumers. 
It is assumed each firm is characterized by a linear expansion path 
independent of the scz~o ~f operations. A less severe assumption is that 
firms have a linear expansion path over the relevant range of production. 
Therefore, the model describing the relative level of interaction between 
industries can be expressed in an input-output matrix by the consistent 
aggregation over products and firms. In the Leontief framework, each xij in 
the input-output transactions matrix X is the optimal value of industry i's 
output used as an input by industry j. 
To examine the vertical linkages between production agriculture and food 
manufacturers, the input-output transactions matrix is constructed using the 
four digit Standard Industrial Classification (S.I.C.) scheme to classify or 
group firms into industries. The industries examined include those within the 
production agriculture sub-sector (S.I.C. 0111 to 0291) and the food 
manufacturing sub-sector (S.I.C. 2011 to 2099). 1 
The input-output transactions matrix is manipulated to form the initial 
component of the up- and down-stream interdependent linkages of the vertical 
coordination index. Two matrices, A and B, are created to capture all net 
production interrelationships for the linkages between farms and food 
processors. Equations 1 and 2 depict matrices A and B, respectively: 
and 
where; 
I 
A 
B 
= identity matrix, r x r, 
the value of the ith industry's output used as an input to the 
jth industry; i, j = 1, ... ,r, 
total value of the output of industry j; j 1, ... ,r, 
[xii/(zi-xii)]ifi=j; Oififj; i,j=l, ... ,r. 
11982 input-output transactions matrix provided by Alward. 
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(1) 
(2) 
Each element of matrix A, aij• represents the percentage of the value of 
industry j's net output contributed by industry i. Each element of B, bij• 
represents the percentage of the value of industry i's output used as an input 
by industry j. In short, matrix A is the up-stream industry connections and 
matrix B is the down-stream industry connections. Notationally, inputs are 
negative as values used in production and outputs are positive. 
In order to calculate vertical interdependence at the industry level, 
two matrices, CK and DK, are defined for each food manufacturing industry 
(four digit S.I.C., 2011 to 2099). Matrices CK and~ capture industry k's 
primary and secondary interindustry connections. The division of industry k 
with its interdependent industries is determined by the flow of net 
production. These matrices are constructed using the rows and columns of 
matrices A and B, specifically, the columns of A and the rows of B. Matrices 
CK and ~ are represented by equations 3 and 4: 
and 
where; 
as(i)s(j) 
~j bs(i)s(j) 
s(i) = industries with which industry k is associated, 
indexed by i; i = 1 ... n (n ~ r), 
cij the percentage of the value of industry s(j)'s net output 
contributed by industry s(i), 
dij the percentage of the value of industry s(i)'s net output 
used as an input to industry s(j). 
(3) 
(4) 
For matrix CK, for column j where j = k, industry k has a primary input 
relationship with industry i and for column j, j f k, industry k has .a 
secondary input relationship with industry i. It is the obverse for matrix 
DK, for row i, i = k, industry k has a primary output relationship with 
industry j and for row i, i f k, k has a secondary output relationship with 
industry j. 
Previous attempts to measure the degree of vertical coordination 
(Laffer, Tucker and Wilder, Ravenscraft, Maddigan, Levy, and MacDonald) did 
not fully incorporate direct and indirect coordinating arrangements (i.e. spot 
markets, various contracts, and integration) between interdependent 
industries. To complete the vertical coordination index, the degree of 
administrative control that is transferred to or shared by the 
contractor/integrator must be specified. 
Administration of vertical interdependencies may be accomplished through 
direct ownership and/or a wide variety of contractual relationships. This 
implies the existence of a progressive relationship of shared control between 
the end points of no shared control (spot markets) and complete integration. 
Along this continuum, as firms use various types of contracts to transfer 
resources, the contractor/integrator internalizes increasing degrees of 
control over productive resources. 
To calculate the vertical coordination for the food processing 
industries, it is necessary to have data regarding the use of various 
coordinating structures in agriculture. There is no systematic reporting and 
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collection of agricultural contract data. But, a number of researchers have 
provided various estimates on contracts consistent with the Mighell and Jones 
classification. Therefore, the Mighell and Jones' contract scheme is 
utilized. 
To capture an industry's primary and secondary contractual interactions, 
matrices EK and FK are created. Each eij represents the measure of shared 
control for industry k with the up-stream industry i. Similarly, each fij 
represents industry k's shared control with down-stream industry j. Five 
coordination structures are used; 1) spot markets, 2) market specification 
contracts, 3) production management contracts, 4) resource providing 
contracts, and 5) integration. To measure control, each coordinating 
structure is assigned an arbitrary value representing the percent control 
transferred. A decreasing marginality functional relationship is assumed for 
the transfer of control via each coordinating structure. That is, the 
percentage of transferred control is assumed to increase at a decreasing rate 
for each successive coordination structure, moving from spot markets (0%) to 
integration (100%). 2 Equation 5 represents the calculation for matrices E 
and F: 
where; 
n 5 
L: L: LghMghN gh 
g=l h=l 
g number of products produced in each industry, g = 1 ... n, 
h type of governance structure, h = 1 ... 5, 
L for eij• product g's percentage of industry j's input mixture and 
for fij• product g's percentage of industry i's output mixture, 
M assigned value of control, 
N percent of production coordinated by each transaction type. 
With matrices C, D, E, and F, the Vertical Coordination index can be 
calculated. Equation 6 is the generalized formulation of the Vertical 
Coordination index for industry k: 
where; 
i=l 
ci column i of industry k's up-stream connections matrix, 
Di row i of industry k's down-stream connections matrix, 
Ei column i of industry k's up-stream control matrix, 
Fi row i of industry k's down-stream control matrix, 
P vector dot product, 
n = number of industries which industry k is interdependent. 
(5) 
(6) 
2several specifications for the degree of control transferred via various 
coordinating structures were examined. These included decreasing marginality, 
constant marginality, and increasing marginality. In an analysis of the three 
relationships, the decreasing marginality specification provided a stronger 
degree of explanatory power. Refer to Frank, pp. 38-44 and 61-71 for a 
detailed discussion. 
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This specification of Vertical Coordination (VC) has several desirable 
properties. 
1. VC increases (decreases) when an input industry becomes relatively 
more (less) important by accounting for a larger (smaller) percentage of the 
total value of output of another industry. 
2. VC increases (decreases) when relatively more (less) of the output 
of an industry is used as an input to another industry. 
3. VC increases (decreases) as an industry increases (decreases) its 
number of vertical interactions with other industries. 
4. VC increases (decreases) as an industry exercises increased 
(decreased) up- and/or down-stream administrative control. 
5. The range of VC is between 0 and 1. 
Data on the usage of each type of coordination structure by food 
processors were unavailable. In order to approximate the up-stream control of 
the food manufacturing industries, data on the types of ~own-stream contracts 
utilized and the percentage of output transacted under each type of contract 
by the farm sector were used. 
The values for each coordinating structure (i.e. spot markets, various 
types of contracts, and integration), Table 1, are used to represent the 
percentage of each used to coordinate farm commodity inputs in each food 
manufacturing industry. These figures represent only the food processing 
industries' use of such structures to organize their primary linkages with 
farm output. 
However, in some cases this results in a understatement of. the 
utilization of contracts and integration by the food processing industries. 
For many farm products, the first handler is also a food processor. In such 
cases, integration will be understated to the extent that internal transfer of 
procured farm commodities exceeds farmer-processor integration. For example, 
in the dairy industry, only the coordinating structure data for fluid milk 
were available. Thus, the same data were utilized for each dairy processing 
industry, even though many dairy products (e.g. butter, cheese, etc.) are 
manufactured by the same firm that processes fluid milk, that is, are 
vertically integrated. 
The coordinating structure data, Table 1, represents only the linkages 
between the farm output and food manufacturing sectors. There is a need for 
intra-food industry coordinating structure data. Many food manufacturing 
industries procure a portion of their inputs from other food processing 
industries. However, food manufacturing industry down-stream coordinating 
structure data are not available. Therefore, the F-matrix in the Vertical 
Coordination index (equation 6) cannot be calculated. The absence of such 
data bias the vertical coordination index values downward. Moreover, this 
bias does not uniformly affect each food processing industry. If industry 
data were available, a clearer understanding of the vertical coordination 
relationships of the food manufacturing industries should result. 
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Table 1. Percentage of U.S. Food Processing Industries' Farm Originated Inputs Coordinated Through 
Various Structures. 
Contracts 
Industry Spot Market Production Resource Integration 
Market a Specification Management Providing 
(percent) 
Meat Packing 89.5 7.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 
Sausages and other prepared meats 89.3 7.2 0.0 0.0 3.5 
Poultry dressing 13.0 0.0 0.0 73.0 14.0 
Poultry and egg processing 6.5 0.0 18.5 48.2 26.8 
Creamery butter 17.7 81.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 
Cheese, natural and processed 17.7 81.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 
Condensed and evaporated milk 17.7 81.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 
Ice cream and frozen desserts 19.0 70.8 3.6 0.0 6.6 
Fluid milk 17.7 81.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 
Canned specialties 30.1 6.2 38.8 0.0 24.9 
Canned fruits and vegetables 35.4 10.4 30.6 0.0 23.6 
Dehydrated fruits, vegetables and soups 24.9 14.0 33.4 0.0 27.7 
Pickles, sauces, and salad dressings 36.9 1.3 40.3 0.0 21.5 
Frozen fruits and vegetables 24.9 14.0 33.4 0.0 27.7 
Frozen specialties 19.3 14.0 15.7 24.1 26.9 
Flour and other mill products 91.7 7.8 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Cereal breakfast foods 81.6 13.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 
Rice milling 91.5 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Wet corn milling 92.5 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Dog, cat, and other pet food 93.3 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
Prepared feeds, n.e.c. 92.4 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Bread, cake, and related products 40.0 35.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 
Cookies and crackers 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Raw & refined cane and beet sugar 0.0 0.0 69.0 0.0 31.0 
Confectionery products 85.0 12.3 0.0 0.0 2.7 
Chocolate and cocoa productsb 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cottonseed oil mills 82.3 16.7 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Soybean oil mills 89.5 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Vegetable oil mills, n.e.c. 89.5 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Animal and marine fats and oils 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Shortening and cooking oils 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Malt beverages 93.2 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 
Malt 92.5 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Wines, brandy, and brandy spirits 32.0 41.0 0.0 0.0 27.0 
Distilled liquor, except brandy 92.5 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Bottled and canned soft drinksb 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Flavoring extracts and syrups, n.e.c.b 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Canned and cured seafoods 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Fresh or frozen packaged fish 96.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Roasted coffeeb 100.0 0.0 0.0 o.o 0.0 
Macaroni and spaghetti 11.0 0.0 45.0 0.0 44.0 
Food preparations, n.e.c. 79.0 16.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 
aResidual values. 
blndustry had no up-stream linkages. 
Sources: Compiled from Marion 1986, Krause, Crom, Lasley, Van Ardsall et al., Flinchbaugh, Reimund et al., and Buckley et al.. 
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Empirical Specification of Transaction Costs Variables 
To explain the incidence of vertical coordination between farm and food 
manufacturing industries due to transactional inefficiencies, several 
industrial characteristics affecting transaction costs are examined. These 
include future demand growth and uncertainty, market power, product and 
technical differentiation, and firm size and specialization. 
Future demand growth and the uncertainty of demand influence 
organizational characteristics. Williamson (1979, pg. 260) states, "as 
generic demand grows and the number of supply sources increases, exchange that 
was once transaction specific loses this characteristic and greater reliance 
on market mediated governance is feasible." As future demand increases, the 
motivation to vertically coordinate by means of non-market institutions 
diminishes. However, as demand uncertainty increases, market transactions 
become increasingly costly. With increased uncertainty, firms rely more on 
various governance structures to attenuate the costs associated with 
uncertainties. To capture anticipated demand growth (ADG) and unanticipated 
demand uncertainty (UNANT), the log of food industry sales are regressed on a 
time trend. 3 The values for ADG and UNANT are the time trend coefficient and 
the variance of the error term, respectively. 
As the number of buyers and sellers in a market diminishes, "small 
numbers bargaining problems" become more prevalent. In such circumstances, 
firms utilize non-market institutions to reduce potential opportunistic 
behavior. To capture the buyer concentration and market power for the food 
industries, the food manufacturing industries' four firm concentration ratio 
(CR4) is used. Two variables capturing seller (input supplier) concentration, 
one each for the farm output industries and food manufacturing industries, are 
calculated. The variable FSGC is the farm output industry's GINI coefficient 
weighted by the net contribution of each farm output industry as a supplier to 
each food Lndustry. 4 Similarly, the variable FUSC is the weighted four firm 
concentration ratio of the food manufacturing industries that supply inputs to 
food processors (e.g. meat packing industry supplying inputs to the sausage 
and prepared meats industry). 
Firms that produce specialized or differentiated products are 
particularly concerned about their product demand and input supply. Such 
firms may have increased asset specificity (i.e. idiosyncratic investments). 
Likewise, industries with highly intensive technical production processes may 
require some form of idiosyncratic investment. Both factors may result in an 
increased need to vertically coordinate. To measure these differential 
characteristics, the industry advertising to sales ratio (AS) and industry 
ratio of research and development expenditures to sales (RD) are utilized. 5 
3Measures developed by Levy. 
4The farm industry GINI coefficient is calculated from Lorenz curves based 
upon the ratio of cumulative percent of output to cumulative percent of farms 
in each size classification, using Census of Agriculture data. 
5Advertising expenditures provided by Rogers and research and development 
expenditures in Scherer. 
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Firms have the incentive to vertically coordinate to capture flow 
economies in the production process. The closer the stages of production, the 
greater the incentive to vertically coordinate. Utilized as a proxy for flow 
economies, a food production dispersion index (FPDI) is calculated to capture 
the proximity of output-input enterprises. As the index increases in value, 
the lesser the incentive to vertically coordinate. The FPDI for industry k 
is: 
where; 
n 
L IFr - Pfl] k = 1 to n. (7) 
i=l 
the percent of farm output commodity c produced in region i, 
the percent of processed food k manufactured in region i, 
percent of commodity c's net contribution to food industry k. 
The costs of internalizing transactions must also be considered. Firms 
will internalize transactions up to the point where the market costs of an 
activity outweigh the costs of internalization. Several firm/industry 
characteristics may determine internal costs of administrative control. These 
include firm size, firm specialization, and capital intensity. Variables to 
proxy these characteristics include average firm (establishment) size in sales 
(AESS), the industry specialization ratio (SPCR), and the capital to sales 
ratio (KS). In the short run, increases in firm size lead to diseconomies and 
their associated costs, reducing the incentive to vertically coordinate. 
Stigler has demonstrated that as a firm specializes in a particular product, 
it vertically disintegrates to more fully capture increased scale economies. 
Finally, the greater the capital intensity, concomitant with uncertainty, 
firms will vertically coordinate to maintain production capacity. A summary 
description of the explanatory variables along with their expected signs is 
presented in Table 2. 
Results 
The analysis was based on 1982 data for 42 four-digit S.l.C. food 
manufacturing industries. Using variations of equation 6, four progressively 
comprehensive vertical coordination measures were specified; 1) VCl, the food 
industry's up-stream linkages, 2) AVC, the up-stream transfer of control via 
coordinating structures, 3) VC2, up-stream linkages plus up-stream control, 4) 
VC3, the up- and down-stream linkages plus up-stream control. The amount of 
information incorporated into the four vertical coordination measures 
progressively increases from VCl to VC3. As the amount of information 
increases, the value of the index increases, revealing the importance of each 
coordinating factor. 
The estimated coefficients for the vertical coordination variable 
incorporating only industry up-stream connections, VCl (Table 3), were 
generally mixed regarding expected signs. The coefficients for RD, UNANT, 
FPDI, and FSGC were of expected sign and significant. Estimates for CR4, KS, 
and AESS were of opposite sign and also significant. The coefficients for AS, 
ADG, SPCR, and FUSC were not statistically different from zero. This equation 
attained a relatively low coefficient of determination (R2 = 36) and the set 
of explanatory variables failed to significantly explain the variation in the 
dependent variable (F-value, Table 3). 
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Table 2. Explanatory Variables Used In Analysis of Vertical Coordination. 
Explanatory 
Variable 
CR4 
RD 
AS 
KS 
AESS 
SPCR 
ADG 
UN ANT 
FPDI 
FSGC 
FUSC 
Description 
Four Firm Concentration Ratio 
Ratio of Research and Development 
Expenditures to Sales 
Ratio of Advertising Expenditures to Sales 
Ratio of Capital to Sales 
Average Establishment Size by Sales 
Industry Specialization Ratio 
Anticipated Demand Growth 
Unanticipated Events 
Food Production Dispersion Index, 
A Proxy For Flow Economies 
Farm Output Sector Weighted 
Gini Coefficient 
Up-Stream Food Manufactures' Weighted 
Four Firm Concentration Ratio 
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Expected 
Sign 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Table 3. Transactions Costs Effects On Vertical Coordination. 
Deoendent Variables 
Explanatory VC1 AVC VC2 VC3 
Variables (t-statistics in parenthesis) 
constant 0.31 1.38c 1.18c 0.98c 
(1.00) (2.90) (3.04) (2.73) 
CR4 -0.003aa 0.0004 -o.0014 0.0001 
(1. 75) (0.12) (0.49) (0.052) 
RD 11.44c 0.58 7.51 10.55b 
(2.55) (0.057) (1.10) (2.23) 
AS -1.39 1.41 -0.94 -2.93bb 
(1.53) (0.75) (0.60) (2.50) 
KS -0.59cc 0.31 -0.19 -0.063 
(4.44) (1.07) (0.77) (0.28) 
AESS o.oo3rc -0.0052c -0.0008 -0.0006 
(3.93) (2.55) (0.54) (0.33) 
SPCR -0.0005 -n.o1r -0.013c -o.011c 
(0.16) (3.71) (3.47) (3.20) 
ADG 0.0057 -1.36 -1.34 -1.28 
(0.005) (0.98) (1.23) (1.20) 
UNANT 1.03a -1.59 0.35 0.83 
(1.41) (1.17) (0.36) (1.03) 
FPDI -0.032a 0.007 -0.02 -o.036a 
(1.62) (0.20) (0.77) (1.55) 
FSGC o.2r 0.005c 0.005c 1.01c 
(3.50) (6.66) (9.30) (10.98) 
FUSC 0.0003 0.005c 0.005c 0.004c 
(0.24) (3.21) (3.89) (3.64) 
R2 0.36 0.65 0.74 0.75 
F-value 1.52 5.12c 7.80c 8.15c 
OF 30 30 30 30 
Note: a, b, and c are significant at the 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99 level for a one-tailed test, respectively. 
aa, bb, and cc are significant at the 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99 level for a two-tailed test, respectively. 
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Focussing on the vertical coordination variables that incorporate 
governance structures (AVC, VC2, and VC3), the coefficients for CR4, RD, AESS, 
SPCR, ADG, UNANT, FPDI, FSGC, and FUSC were generally of expected sign (Table 
3). For these coefficients, all were significant to at least the 0.10 level 
except CR4, ADG, and UNANT. The coefficients for AS and KS were generally of 
opposite sign while only AS was significantly different from zero. Each of 
these three estimated relationships explained at least 65 percent of the total 
variation in vertical coordination as illustrated by the coefficient of 
determination (R2). Moreover, the test of the overall relation (F-value) for 
each equation was significant at the 0.99 level. Interestingly, the vertical 
coordination measure incorporating only up-stream linkages, VCl, was not 
revealing while the measure of up-stream governance structures, AVC, was quite 
significant. Also of particular importance, the two measures that combined 
coordination structures with input-output linkages (VC2 and VC3) were 
associated with the largest R2 's and F-values. 
Further, based on the combined regression equation characteristics of 
R2 , F-value, and number of significant independent transaction cost variables, 
VC3, the vertical coordination measure incorporating the greatest amount of 
information, both input-output linkages and the use of coordinating 
structures, appears to be the most robust specification. Hypothetically, a 
VC4 measure that incorporates the F-matrix of down-stream coordination 
structures would perform even better. 
A comparison of the most robust of these vertical coordination measures, 
VC3, with previously used measures of vertical structure is presented in Table 
4. First, Maddigan's VIC index which captures up- and down-stream linkages 
was examined with the same set of transaction cost explanatory variables. The 
coefficients for RD, UNANT, FPDI, and FSGC were of expected sign and 
statistically significant. The estimates for AS, KS, and AESS were also 
statistically significant but of opposite sign. The estimated coefficients 
for the remaining independent variables, CR4, SPCR, ADG, and FUSC were not 
statistically different from zero. Overall, VIC did not perform well. Its 
estimated equation achieved a relatively low coefficient of determination (R2 
= 0.37) and the overall test of the relationship was not significant (F-value, 
Table 4). The vertical coordination measure VC3, which adds coordinating 
structures to VIC, performed considerably better. Thus, recognition of 
coordinating structures as a factor of interdependence appears to be 
empirically important when examining vertical coordination. 
The other dependent variable examined was a traditional measure of 
vertical integration, VI, defined as the value-added to sales ratio. The 
coefficients for CR4, AS, KS, AESS, and FUSC were of expected sign and 
statistically significant. Only the estimate for UNANT was of opposite sign 
and significant. The coefficients for the remaining independent variables, 
RD, SPCR, ADG, FPDI, and FSGC, were not statistically different from zero. 
The estimated equation for VI performed well relative to VIC with an R2 of 
0.69 and an F-value significant at the 0.99 level. 
A comparison between the estimated equations for VI and VC3 is 
revealing. Both equations revealed five explanatory variables that were of 
the theoretically expected sign and statistically significant. But only one 
independent variable, FUSC, has the same sign and was significant in both 
equations. Another variable, AS, was significant in both equations, but with 
different signs. The variable, ADG, was not statistically significant in 
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Table 4. Comparisons of Transactions Costs Effects On Vertical Coordination and Vertical Integration. 
Dependent Variables 
Explanatory VIC VI VC3 
Variables (t-statistics in parenthesis) 
constant 0.11 0.06 0.98c 
(0.36) (0.28) (2.73) 
CR4 -Q.001 0.004c 0.0001 
(0.28) (3.01) (0.052) 
RD 12.70b -1.36 10.55b 
(2.26) (0.35) (2.23) 
AS -3.62cc 2.05b -2.93bb 
(4.61) (2.28) (2.50) 
KS -0.43cc 0.18a -Q.063 
(2.89) (1.49) (0.28) 
AESS 0.0038cc -0.003c -Q.0006 
(3.23) (2.50) (0.33) 
SPCR 0.0016 0.0004 -Q.011c 
(0.54) (0.24) (3.20) 
ADG -0.26 0.13 -1.28 
(0.22) (0.25) (1.20) 
UNANT 1.45b -1.88cc 0.83 
(1.85) (3.22) (1.03) 
FPDI -Q.045a 0.005 -Q.036a 
(1.56) (0.35) (1.55) 
FSGC 0.30c -Q.02 1.01c 
(3.44) (0.33) (10.98) 
FUSC -0.0008 0.003c 0.004c 
(0.59) (4.99) (3.64) 
R2 0.37 0.69 0.75 
F-value 1.72 6.06c 8.15c 
DF 30 30 30 
Note: a, b, and care significant at the 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99 level for a one-tailed test, respectively. 
aa, bb, and cc are significant at the 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99 level for a two-tailed test, respectively. 
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either estimated equation. 
other explanatory variables 
were significant in one but 
The estimated regression coefficients 
(CR4, RD, KS AESS, SPCR, UNANT, FPDI, 
not both equations. 
for all 
and FSGC) 
This suggests that the two alternative concepts of vertical structure 
are influenced by different transactional cost factors. Possible, the 
explanatory variables with significant coefficients in the VC3 equation may be 
better proxies for capturing the factors influencing contractual use, whereas 
some of the significant variables in the VI equation are more strongly related 
to such factors as profitability (i.e. CR4) which are inherent in the 
traditional value-added to sales ratio specification of vertical integration. 
Clearly there is room to improve theoretical constructs as well as empirical 
specifications. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Based upon a specification of vertical coordination that incorporates 
product flow linkages plus the use of coordinating structures between 
vertically interdependent firms, empirical analysis supports the hypothesis 
that transaction costs are a primary motivation for vertical coordination. 
The transaction cost factors found to be most influential are those 
specifically related to research and development, internal costs, flow 
economies, and input supplier concentration. Two factors affecting internal 
costs are negatively related with vertical coordination, firm size and 
specialization. 
Comparison of the results between the vertical coordination measures VIC 
and VCl, which capture only product flow interdependencies, 6 and the other 
specifications, AVC, VC2, and VC3, which capture interdependencies plus 
coordinating structures, reveals the importance of non-market exchange 
mechanisms in attenuating transactional inefficiencies. In addition, 
comparison of the traditional VI measure and VC3 reveals differences in the 
factors affecting each. In previous studies of vertical industrial 
organization, the role of non-market exchange mechanisms outside the dominion 
of vertical integration (ownership) was not empirically examined. The results 
herein demonstrate that a variable capturing coordinating structures bridges 
the gap in the dichotomy of market versus ownership coordination (vertical 
integration). 
While this is a prom~s~ng start in specifying a robust measurement of 
vertical coordination, much work remains. Simply to improve the accu··acy of 
the measure, much greater detail on the types of coordinating structures used 
and their relative importance is needed. Not only is information on 
coordinating structures between farms and food processors needed, but also 
among processors and down-stream distributors and ultimately, consumers. 
6vc1 is based on matrix C, the food processor up-stream product flow 
linkages, while VIC incorporates both up- and down-stream linkages, matrices C 
and D. 
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Additionally, better measures of factors influencing transaction costs 
should yield greater insight into the determinants of vertical coordination. 
In the end, much analysis is needed regarding the relationships between 
vertical coordination and market performance. To what extent, for example, 
does vertical coordination reduce transactional inefficiencies, enhance 
competitiveness, influence profitability, and affect economic welfare. 
17 
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